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CALIFORNIA JUDGE SPEAKS OUT
Judge Wilbur C. Curtis, of Los Angeles, makes two
suggestions to "point the way back to public respect for the
courts and the Bar."
He says, first, "Provide by law that every representation of fact, made by a lawyer while acting in the capacity of
an attorney at law, shall be deemed to have been made under
oath and subject to all the pains and penalties of perjury.
I think that in time this would help to restore the lawyer to
the high place in public esteem which he possessed in the
ancient days when it was said that a lawyer's word was as
good as his bond."
There may be merit in this suggestion, but it seems
rather drastic, and, in view of the fact that lawyers are dependent upon others for these statements of fact, the suggestion might lead to rather serious and unjustified consequences.
The other suggestion, that "attorneys restore confidence
in the courts by refraining from unjustly criticising it in the
presence of clients or the public," is worth noting seriously.
We agree with him, "It is too common a practice for an
attorney, upon losing a case, to blame it on the ignorance or
prejudice of the Judge, instead of on the failure of witnesses
to convince"; and so, while interpretations of the word "unjustly" might vary, and though there may be some merit in
the claim that appellate courts too frequently rely upon the
"abuse of discretion" theory to sustain decisions of trial
courts, neither statement is sufficient entirely to overcome
the pertinence of the Judge's suggestion.

